Insane and Non-Insane Automatism

Distinguishing between external and internal causes is an unsatisfactory and deficient way of addressing the issue of insane and non-insane automatism - Justin Santiago

Insane and non-insane automatism are defences to a charge of murder as they negate the necessary mens rea for the crime which is the intention to kill or cause grevious bodily harm.

The courts have rationalized that cause of the state of mind is the main factor for distinguishing insane and non-insane automatism. Because of the wide differences in the burden of proof and the outcome if the plea is successful the courts have rationalized subtle differences between internal and external causes. However this becomes very difficult as there is an overlap between the two and the fact that involuntariness is common to both cases. The right way to look at these issues is to refrain from categorizing mental states and instead focus on the level of control in the hands of the defendant that would mitigate the crime.

The definition of insanity as propounded in the M’Naghten rules requires that there be a defect of reason caused by a disease of the mind such that the defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act. Insanity is a general defence to all crimes (unable to form mens rea) and A will be found not guilty by reason of insanity and confined to a mental hospital at her majesty’s pleasure.

For there to be a disease of the mind it has to be caused by an internal factor and is prone to recur : Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland and whether the disease is curable or incurable, transitory or permanent : R v Kemp. Where the defendant raises a plea of insanity it is on a balance of probabilities and if successful will result in a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity and the defendant is admitted to a special hospital where he might be detained indefinitely. The internal factor argument extends the reach of M’Naghten Rules to such diverse persons such as epileptics : R v Campbell, diabetics, PMS sufferers : R v Reynolds and it seems illogical to label all people suffering from such conditions as insane.

Automatism on the other hand is the movement of muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, reflex action or convulsion or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing and the relevant cases are Broome v Perkins and R v Charlson. The defence of automatism negates the actus reus of the crime and leads to a complete acquittal.

The cause of automatism is due to an external factor such as consumption of medication or alcohol, a blow to the head or the administration of an anaesthesic which will usually have a transitory effect. The issue of self induced automatism further provides proof that the cause of it is an external factor, within one’s control : R v Bailey. When the defendant raises a plea of non-insane automatism the burden to disprove is on the prosecution and if successful will result in a complete acquittal.

In the case of diabetes, the internal external factor argument becomes confusing. A diabetic who suffers from hypoglycaemia (low blood sugare) as a result of an overdose of insulin cannot avail himself of the defence of insanity as the insulin is an external factor : R v Quick whereas if the same diabetec suffers from hyperglycaemia (high blood sugar) as a result of failing to take insulin he can plead insanity: R v Hennesy although the insulin is still an external factor in this case.

A blow on the head (external factor) may inflict permanent damage in which case that damage will be an internal factor, giving rise to a defence of insanity. The internal factor argument excludes defects of reason caused by dissociative states resulting from external factors such as psychological blows : R v Rabey or rape which caused post traumatic stress disorder : R v T when in reality these diseases are likened to depression which are certified medical conditions and should rightly be internal factors.

The courts have also seems to have neglected to address evidence of purposive conduct in disproving insanity : Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland where the accused pleaded insanity due to psychomotor epilepsy yet undertook acts that had every appearance of being controlled by the brain.

In R v Burgess it was argued that what was important was the uncontrolled recurrence of the mental condition not the fact that the cause was internal or external. This follows from R v Sullivan where the nature of the disease was irrelevant and what was important was that it had affected the mental faculties. This approach associated with level of control of the criminal is deemed to be more practical rather than establishing the mental state of the criminal in establishing a defence.