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Justin Santiago, BAppSc (Hons), MBA, LLB (Hons) comes from a journalism, market research, intellectual property and strategic communications consulting background. He has recently obtained his Trust and Estate Professional (TEP) title and is embarking on a mission to promote the concept of The Global Citizen.
Showing posts with label Law of Contract. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Law of Contract. Show all posts

Saturday, June 13, 2009

Terms and Conditions

Too great a willingness to classify a term as a condition encourages termination of contracts rather than their performance 

Because a contract consists of terms of varying importance it is necessary to separate the importance terms from the less importance ones. However in most contracts it will not be expressly stated whether a term is a condition or warranty which are how terms are typically classified. Because of the severe consequences attached to a breach of a condition namely resulting in the termination of the contract and the awarding of damages for any loss suffered (or alternatively in the affirmation of the contract and a recovery of damages for the breach) as opposed to a breach of a warranty which only entitled me to claim damages the courts are more cautious than willing to classify terms as conditions.

Courts would look into three ways of classifying terms into conditions or warranties – classification by the parties, statutory classification or judicial classification.

Classification by the parties puts the courts in their role squarely as an interpreter of contracts rather than a maker of them and will only consider it a condition if it has been alluded to as such by the parties. Under the doctrine of the freedom of contract, courts will also not question the parties’ own classification of the contractual term as amounting to a condition : Lombard North Central plc v Butterworth. However the courts must be satisfied that the parties intended to use the term ‘condition’ in its technical sense will be reluctant to give the meaning to the word condition merely by the parties expressly stating it as such : Schuler AG v Wickman Tool Sales Ltd.

The courts will look into what the parties had in mind when they drew up a contract and whether the parties intended it to be a condition : Couchman v Hill as well as other factors such as standard terms on contracts of a certain type as well as the views and practices of the commercial community : State Trading Corporation of India Ltd v M Goldetz Ltd.

Nevertheless the courts have had a difficult time in determining what exactly is meant by going to the root of the contract and this has lead to uncertainty exemplified in The Naxos where different levels of courts had different opinions as to whether the obligation of the seller to have the cargo ready for delivery at any time amounted to a condition or not.

The classification into a condition based on its importance could also result in injustice to an innocent party as in the case of Arcos v Ronnasen where the consequences of a breach of the condition was negligible. There would also be situations where the reason for withdrawal are wholly unrelated to the breach but rather for corollary economic reasons : The Mihalis Angelos.

This led the courts to consider a more flexible approach and to look at other approaches to redress the balance. The first is to limit the number of terms which are classified as conditions.

The second approach is to place a statutory restriction upon the right of a buyer to reject goods for example S15A of SOGA 1979 restricts the right of a buyer to reject goods where the breach is so slight and it would be unreasonable for him to reject them. Thus the buyer would only have a claim in damages.

The thirs approach is to focus more attention on the consequences of breach thereby giving courts greater remedial flexibility. A third classification of term was devised called an inonimate term which is distinguished based on the fact that a breach of this type of term would not give rise automatically to termination, the consequences would have to be serious enough to deprive the innocent party of substantially the whole benefit of what has been bargained for : Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.

This judicial classification was applied in the case of The Hansa Nord where even though a condition was breached the party that wanted to terminate the contract could not because the consequences were not serious. A party could also not use a minor breach by the other party to terminate a contract which has proven to be a bad bargain : Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen Tangen.

The courts would also look into whether withdrawal as an exceptional form of relief be made available only where damages would not be an adequate remedy. More importance placed on the quantification of damages would negate the necessity of withdrawal as an easier route as decided in Bunge v Tradax.

Yet another approach was put forth by Roger Brownsword in his article Retrieving Reasons, Retrieving Rationality who is of the opinion that a termination of a contract should boil down to whether the innocent party had a good reason for doing so. Under this reason centered regime the courts should consider the parties’ reasons for withdrawing. Thus if an innocent party seeks in good faith to withdraw for breach then the right to withdraw should hold without restriction.

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Breach of Contract and Damages

What is a Breach of Contract

A failure to perform a contract in accordance with the terms of the contract is a breach of contract, which will entitle the other party to the contract to an appropriate remedy.

A breach of contract is one of the four principal ways in which a contract can be discharged the others being discharge by performance, by agreement and by operation of law.

Consequences of Breach of Contract

There are three principal consequences of a breach of contract :-

1. The innocent part is entitled to recover damages in respect of the loss which he/she has suffered as a result of the breach
2. The party in breach may be unable to sue to enforce the innocent party's obligation under the contract
3. The breach may entitle the innocent party to terminate further performance of the contract

Every breach of a valid and enforceable contract gives to the innocent party a right to recover damages in respect of the loss suffered as a result of the breach. An action for damages lies whether the term which is broken is a condition, a warranty or an innonimate term.

Therefor the first step is in determining whether it was a term. The courts have adopted an an objective approach and several criteria have been adopted according to Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton :-
verificiation, importance, special knowledge and time statement was made.

Verification

A statement is unlikely to be a term of the contract if the maker of the statement asks the other party to verify its truth : Ecay v Godfrey.

Importance

The more important the matter, the greater the likelihood that the parties intended it to be a term.

Special Knowledge

If the person making the statement has some special knowledge or skill compared to the other party, the statement may be held to be a term : Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams.

Time Statement Was Made

If a statement was made near or at a time the contract was made, it is more likely to be a term : Routledge v McKay.

The next step would be to determine whether the term was a condition, warranty or inonimate term.

A term classified as a condition would enable the injured party to either terminate the performance of the contract and claim for damages or perform the contract despite the breach and recover damages instead : Poussard v Spiers. The exercise of the right to terminate the performance of the contract discharges the primary obligations of both parties for the future and imposes on the party in breach, by way of substitution, an anticipatory secondary obligation to pay damages to the innocent party.

A breach of warranty will only give the injured party the right to claim damages, the performance of the contract cannot be terminated : Bettini v Gye. This is in actual fact the secondary obligation to pay damages a s a result of the breach created.

A breach of an inonimate term could result in one of two things depending on the consequences of a breach. If a breach of the term results in severe loss and damage, the injured party will be entitled to terminate the performance of the contract and parties will treat themselves as being discharged from the contract (prospective only). If the breach involves minor loss, the injured party’s remedies will be restricted to damages.

The aim of an award for damages is to compensate the claimant for the loss which he has suffered as a result of the defendant's breach of contract.

A claimant could claim compensation on a number of grounds which will be determined by the amount of damages which a claimant can recover by way of compensation:-

1. Expectation interest - to put the claimant in the position which he/she would have been in had the contract been performed according to the terms.
2. Reliance interest - to put the claimant in the position he/she would have been in had he/she not entered into the contract.
3. Restitution interest - restore the benefit to the claimant which he/she had conferred upon the seller however the claimaint must establish that the defendant was enriched, that the enrichment was at the claimant's expense and that it was unjust that the defendant retain the benefit without recompensing the claimant.

The courts have come up with a number of doctrines that need to be fulfilled in order for the claimant to claim by way of expectation interest :-

Mitigation

A claimant is under a duty to take all reasonable steps to mitigate his loss ad the claimant must not unreasonable incur expense subsequent to the breach of contract.

Remoteness

A claimant's expectation interest will not be fully protected where some of the loss which he has suffered is too remote a consequence of the defendant's breach of contract - losses that occur naturally or as a result of the usual course of things or were within the reasonable contemplation of both parties ad the time the contract was made.

Causation

A claimant can only recover damages in respect of the losses if there is a casual link between the loss and defendant's breach of contract.

Quantifying the Damage

It was established in Johnson v Agnew that damages are to be assessed as at the date of breach. But, where the claimant is unaware of the breach, damages will generally be assessed as at the date of on which the claimant, could with reasonable diligence, have discovered the breach.

Damages are generally assessed by reference to the market value of the promised contractual performance; that it to say, the claimant's loss is objetviely assessed. It has however also been recognised in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth that the defendant was entitled to loss of amenity damages and the concept of 'consumer surplus' - claimant's subjective valuation of the contractual performance, which may be considered more than the market value - be considered.

Friday, April 3, 2009

Consideration and Promissory Estoppel

"To what extent, if at all, do the principles of consideration and promissory estoppel give the courts the power to enforce, or set aside, promises in the interests of fairness and justice?" - Justin Santiago

The requirement of consideration to support a promise has been debated. This is especially true when parties modify their obligations in the light of changed circumstances. In such cases the courts have invoked the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce a promise not supported by consideration. This discussion will focus on whether the use of promissory estoppel is justified in the light of the importance of having a promise supported by consideration.

Consideration as a requirement for a valid contract stems from the idea of reciprocity as expressed by Lush, J in Currie v Missa that each party accrues a right, interest, profit or benefit in return for some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken.

As an example if I were to pay you fifty pounds to you for mowing my front lawn, I would suffer a loss of fifty pounds but gain the benefit of neatly trimmed front lawn. You would on the other hand suffer the loss of a free afternoon of leisure but gain the benefit of having an extra fifty pounds.

The concept of reciprocity works well in contracts without any modifications in the obligations by either party in light of changed circumstances. However this is not the case where obligations have been modified halfway through the contract. Courts were initially very strict with the consideration requirement as in the case of Stilk v Myrick where the sailors failed in their bid to enforce the promise of extra money for doing additional work due to the desertion of some of the crew as it was decided the performance of an existing contractual obligation did not constitute valid consideration. Similiarly in a long line of cases such as Pinnel’s Case and Foakes v Beer, the courts have never recognised part payments of debts as being valid consideration as the payment of a smaller sum that is owed does not constitute valid consideration as there is no added benefit to the creditor.

It is as if in the mowing the front lawn example you suddenly demanded to have an extra 10 pounds in the middle of the job because it started raining and it made the work more difficult and the fact that you get a good soak in the process. The argument for this case would be that you have undertaken the job and have factored in any additional risks that might occur in the process of completing the job and as such are not entitled to any additional benefit since I do not gain any additional benefit.

Courts in later cases have tried to resolve the issue of unfairness by cases by relaxing the consideration requirement in the name of fairness and justice. In Williams v Roffey Brothers the parties to a continuing contract wished to modify their obligations in the light of changed circumstances. The courts allowed the promisee to enforce the promise even though they were performing existing contractual obligations as the promisor had obviated a disbenefit by not having to switch contractors midway through the project.

I would however argue that the decision in this particular case would have the effect of rewarding the promisee for their ineptness and forcing the promisor into a corner otherwise he would not be able to get the work done.

This decision gave birth to the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the case of Central London Property Ltd v High Trees House. In this case a person will not be allowed to go back on his promise even through the promise was not supported by consideration where the promise was unambiguous, the promise was intending to be relied on and it has been relied on. In this case the additional requirements are would act as mechanisms to protect both parties.

Following the mowing the lawn example, if I had agreed to your request for an additional 10 pounds and you went ahead and bought a hat and boots to make your job easier then the courts may invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the name of fairness.

It appears that courts will still rely on consideration for evidential purposes to determine the validity of a contract. In that sense the doctrine of promissory estoppel requires some element of evidence in order to make a decision in the interest of fairness and justice.

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

Privity of Contract

The doctrine of privity has largely become irrelevant as a result of recent changes - Justin Santiago

Under the doctrine of privity only a party to a contract can sue or be sued on a contract. There are two aspects to this doctrine firstly parties cannot by their contract impose liabilities or burdens upon a third party and secondly strangers to a contract cannot take advantage of its provisions even where the provisions were intended to benefit them.

Criticisms were leveled at the doctrine of privity as it failed to give effect to the expressed intention of the parties and could sometimes lead to results which were regarded as fundamentally unjust and parties that were intended to be benefited were not benefited. The law had become unduly complex with the large number of exceptions to the rule. The doctrine was also commercially inconvenient.

This doctrine was emphasised in a number of cases such as Tweddle v Atkinson where the husband was unable to enforce a promise by his father and father in law to pay him a sum of money because he did not provide consideration. In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Ltd v Selfridge Dunlop sued Selfridge on the basis that the promise between Dew and Selfridge could be imposed as Dew were acting as Dunlop’s agent. The action failed because Dunlop had provided no consideration for the promise of Selfridge, the consideration had been provided by Dew. Tweddle and Dunlop are both consistent with the view that the claimants could not sue because they had not provided consideration for the defendant’s promise. The rigorous application of this rule denied a third party who was a gratuitous beneficiary of the contract.

However there are several exceptions to this rule. Collateral contracts where a contract made by one of the two contractual parties to a 3rd party can be enforced by a 3rd party. In Shanklin Pier Ltd v Detel Products, the claimants instructed their contracts to purchase a particular type of paint from Detel products which turned out to be of inferior quality. The claimants were entitled to damages based on the fact that they had provided consideration in the form of instructions to their contractors.

Under the law of agency, an agent were entitled to take the benefit of the exclusion clause although they were not parties to the contract as they had supplied consideration in the form of performance : the Privy Council case of The Eurymedon however this is contrasted against Scruttons Ltd v Midlands Silicones Ltd which decided that an exclusion clause that protected one party did not extend to his employees and agents.

Under the law of trusts, a trust situation could give rise to obligations by parties to a contract to third parties : Les Affreteurs Reunis v Walford.

Restrictive covenants could be enforced against subsequent purchasers of land who were not party to the original contract : Tulk v Moxhay.

There were also a number of statutory exceptions which allowed third parties to recover compensation such as the Road Traffic Act 1927, the Married Woman’s Property Act 1882 and the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930.

The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 marks an enormous change in the English common law doctrine of privity allowing third parties to enforce a benefit conferred to them. However the Act also allows development of the common law in relation to the doctrine and this has created confusion especially in situations where both common law and statute would apply. Additionally parties must bring themselves within the ambit of the Act and they can exclude its operation from their contract.

The main change that the Act has brought about is that third parties could claim their beneficial rights which has been expressly intended and is not dependent on whether he has provided consideration. This benefit could be in the form of a positive benefit or the provision of an exclusion or limitation of liability. The effect of the Act would mean the cases like Scruttons Ltd v Midlands Silicones Ltd and Beswick v Beswick would be decided differently.

The Act only becomes relevant where the parties expressly state so. Two circumstances may arise with regard to application of the Act. Under S1(1)(a), a third party is given a right to enforce a term if the contract expressly provides that he may. A situation may arise where the contracting parties can make clear their intention not to confer a right of action on the third party. In the second circumstance under S1(1)(b), where the parties do not make their intention express and is silent on whether the contract term purports to confer a benefit on a third party, the difficulty would lie in discerning the intention of the parties except in cases under S1(2) where on a proper construction of the contract it appears that the parties did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third party. The case of Nisshin Shipping Co. Ltd v Cleaves & Co. Ltd put the onus on the party seeking to disapply S1(1)(b) with S1(2).

The Act solidifies situations where a contracting party wants to sue and recover damages in respect of a loss suffered by a 3rd party. Previously the law did not allow for such claims : Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd which also criticized the judgement of Lord Denning in Jackson v Horizon Holidays. Section 1(1)b of the act now would allow the 3rd party to have a direct right of action in such cases.

However the same section will not extend to the White v Jones type of cases which involves a contract for the benefit of a third party but not a promise to confer a benefit on a third party or in cases where a third party has been given his own right of action with the use of a separate contract or with the use of an assignment : Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v. Panatown Ltd which would be better covered under the law of trust or the law of agency.

One further limitation on the right of the third party to sue is that the third party must be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a member of a class or as answering a particular description but need not be in existence when the contract is entered into – S1(3). Thus the Act would not give the third party a right of action on the facts of a case such as Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd because the third party was not identified in the contract.

Intention to Create Legal Relations

The doctrine of intention to create legal relations is based on considerations of policy - Justin Santiago

The doctrine of intention to create legal intentions is an essential part of any contract and it has become increasingly important especially in contracts where there is no clear indication on paper that the parties have entered into a contract. This is clearly a matter of policy otherwise commercial agreements would not be enforceable and parties would be afraid to enter into commercial contracts.

The importance of this doctrine becomes evident depending on the setting where the agreement was made – was it a domestic or social setting or a commercial setting? In domestic agreements there would have to be clear evidence of an intention to create legal relations whereas in a commercial agreement there is a presumption to create legal relations and strong evidence would have to be adduced to suggest otherwise.

Arrangements between a husband and wife is presumed not to be legally enforeceable : Balfour v Balfour. Similarly agreements between parents and children are similarly not binding : Jones v Padavatton. Social arragements are also presumed not to give rise to legal relations : Lens v Devonshire Social Club. The crux in all these cases is that the parties did not intend their agreement to be attended by legal consequences.

But what exactly is the motivation for keeping such contracts out of the courtroom? Did Lord Atkin in his judgement in Balfour v Balfour inquire into the intention of the parties or did he simply hold that agreements between parties having natural love and affection should be confined to the home and not unleashed into the courtroom otherwise “the courts of this country would have to be multiplied one hundredfold. It was a clear signal that the courts were reluctant to extend the law of contract into the area of matrimonial rights and duties.

While the judgement sends out a signal that the requirement of intention to create legal relations was only a policy, it is not entirely clear that it is appropriate for modern society in which family law ‘has steadily embraced contract as its governing principle’.

Courts genuinely seek to discover the intention of the parties. The courts therefore have devised certain methods to discover the intention of the parties and this intention need not be in the minds of the contracting parties reflecting the objective evaluation of intention. The presumption that domestic and social arrangement did not intend their agreement to be attended by legal consequences would have to be rebutted by objective evidence to the contrary based on the following factors :-

1. Context in which the agreement is made

In Snelling v John G Snelling Ltd it was inferred that an agreement entered into by three brothers who were directors of a family company relating to the running of the company was an intention to create legal relations. In Merrit v Merrit even though it was a husband and wife situation, they were about to separate and the presumption of the intention to create legal relations does not operate beause the parties were bargaining keenly and did not rely on honourable understandings.

2. Regard to any reliance which has been placed upon the agreement

Where one party has acted to his detriment on the faith of the agreement a court may be more willing to conclude that the agreement was intended to have legal consequences. Detriment would mean a major shift in position such as selling of house: Parker v Clark and not merely the payment of a regular weekly sum for a daily lift to work : Coward v Motor Insurers’ Bureau.

3. Certainty of the agreement

There must not be any vagueness : Vaughan v Vaughan

The courts too are reluctant to have as a determining factor of an intention to create legal relations the willingness of the parties to sue to enforce the agreement if one party has performed one side of the bargain and the other side have not : Albert v MIB.

With regard to commercial agreements, there is a presumption that the parties do intend to crate legal relations. The operation of the presumption can be seen in the case of Esso Petroleum Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise where a heavy reliance on the onus of proof is required to rebut the presumption in commercial transactions.

The presumption may be rebutted by an express term of the contract which states that the parties did not intend to create legal relatiosn such as ‘subject to contract’ and honour clauses as decided in Rose and Franck Co v H R Crompton and Bros Ltd where the words used must be clear : Home Insurance co v Administratia Asigularaliror.

Frustration

It is difficult to ascertain when a frustrating event has occurred. In practice, there are, therefore, few cases of frustrated contracts – Justin Santiago

Frustration is an event that occurs after the formation of the contract which renders the performance of the contract impossible, illegal or something radically different from that which was in the contemplation of the parties at the time at which they entered into the contract: Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC.

The effects of frustration on a contract are severe : Under S1(2) of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts Act) 1943, the contract would come to any end and the claimants put in a position prior to the contract which means any money paid prior to the frustrating event will be returned, balance of payment due will cease to be payable, any expenses incurred will be set off against money received.

Because of the harsh consequences of its effect which is termination, frustration has been applied only in very limited situations and will not be invoked to assist a party who is looking for a way out of a bad bargain. The narrow application in this doctrine has its origins in a time of the absolutist approach where once a party had assumed an obligation he was bound to make it good : Paradine v Jane. Lord Roskill said that the doctrine of frustration was 'not lightly to be invoked to relieve contracting parties of the normal consequences of imprudent commercial bargains', in Pioneer Shipping v BTP Tioxide.

In arguing frustration the claimant would have to argue there will not be full performance of the contract. It can be argued based on the case of Krell v Henry that the purpose of the contract is no longer achievable. Since this purpose cannot be achieved the contract is frustrated and brought to an end. However based on cases like Herne Bay Steam Boat v Hutton if the contract can be executed albeit at a later date the contract is still not considered frustrated. If it merely increases the cost and makes the job more onerous and does not radically or fundamentally alter the nature of performance the contract would not be frustrated : Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee & Thorl GMBH.

Additionally supervening or unforeseen event must pass the foreseeability test i.e. a party cannot rely on an event which was, or should have been, foreseen by him but not by the other party : Walton Harvey Ltd v Walker and Homfrays. Therefor to invoke frustration the event must not have been contemplated by any one of the parties at the time of the contract.

Additionally the presence of a force majeur clause in a contract is sufficient to exclude the operation of the doctrine of frustration : Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H. v Vanden Avenne-Izegem P.V.B.A. where it was contended that there was no room for the doctrine of frustration to apply because of the elaborate force majeure clauses included in the contract.

Force majeur clauses are handy devices in offering parties the opportunity to escape from the narrowness of the doctrine of frustration by including within their force majeur clause an event which would not, at common law, be sufficient to frustrate a contract. However there is a limit to the operation of force majeure clauses. Force majeure clauses are seen as unable to cover every single event as in doing so would entail drafting them in very broad terms. Courts are reluctant to give effect to force majeure clauses that are drafted in broad terms as they are of the opinion that such clauses are only used to cover a temporary difficulty specifically outlined and not events of great magnitude or fundamental changes : Metropolitan Water Board v Dick, Kerr & Co, The Playa Larga.

Additionally Ewan McKendrick in “Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract” has recommended that the courts uphold the contract in light of renegotiations after the occurrence of an unforeseen event rather than employ the doctrine of frustration. His argument is supported by Adams and Brownsword in “Contract, Consideration and the Critical Path” where he pointed that the doctrine of frustration firmly sets its face against assisting parties to renegotiate a contract, despite there being circumstances beyond the control of the parties.

Also measures to renegotiate a contract after the occurrence of an unforeseen event are seen to be effective measures to avoid discharging the contract for frustration.

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

Mistake as to identity

The law relating to mistake as to identity is in a convoluted mess - Justin Santiago

Mistake as to identity occurs when parties to a contract are mistaken as to the identity of the person they are contracting with. What commonly happens is that one party misrepresents his or her identity (the rogue) in order to persuade the other party to contract with him to take away goods on credit. The rogue will then sell the goods to a third party. In such cases the rogue would have disappeared and the innocent party will want to seek to recover the goods from the third party and the only way to do this is to find a way to declare that the contract was void and no title has passed under the doctrine of mistake as to identity.

The law on mistake as to identity rests on established priciples governing the formation of contracts. A mistake as to identity eats at the very heart of contract law which states that there must be consensus at idem – a meeting of the minds which could lead to an agreement and hence a contract. When there is a mistake to identity a contract does not come into existence because one party never intended to deal with the other party in the first place. This is also consistent with the nemo dat quad quod non habet rule which states that the rogue will not be able to pass on the title to a third party no matter how innocent this party is.

However case law shows that cases involving mistake as to identity have become unnecessarily complex. Case law over the years has been decided differently depending on who the law felt it should protect and in the process coming up with various conditions to justify their decision in such matters. In Ingram v Little the courts felt it was the sellers who needed protection because they were seen as helpless parties at the mercy of a rogue and the justification for voiding the contract was the fact that they had made checks on the identity of the buyer. In Lewis v Averay it was decided that the seller and the third party were on equal footing it was not necessary to protect the seller and the contract was deemed to be valid.

The law that went on to distinguish between contracts made inter prasentes or inter absentes which made the matter of mistake as to identity even more confusing. Where the parties deal with each other in a face to face transaction (inter prasentes), there is a strong presumption that each party intends to deal with the party in front of him that can only be rebutted in exceptional cases (as in Ingram v Little). With regard to contracts made inter absentes the courts appear to be more willing to infer that a party has made a mistake as to the identity. This was the decision in the House of Lords case of Cundy v Lindsay where it was held that where the parties are not physically in each others presence, eg, they are dealing by correspondence, and one party is mistaken as to the identity of the other then the contract will be void for mistake. This supposedly in line with the proposition that there is a need for greater certainty in relation to written contracts. However within this so called certainty lies several exceptions which was highlighted in the case of King's Norton Metal Co Ltd v Edridge Merrett Co Ltd where it was held that if the innocent party was not particularly interested in the identity of the third party then the contract will not be void. The reasoning was that the innocent party was more interested in the attributes of the other party whereas in the case of Cundy v Lindsay the innocent parties wanted to deal specifically with Blenkiron & Co and not the rogue Blenkarn.

The decision in Cundy v Lindsay was affirmed in Shogun Finance Limited v Hudson (Shogun) where it was deemed that cases of mistaken identity preclude any offer or acceptance taking place.

There is however uncertainty as to why a written contract should be any different from a face to face contract and why should the courts be more willing to accept mistake as to identity in a written contract and why should the mode of communication matter. Shogun did not go to the bottom of these issues although one of the dissenting judges, Lord Nicholls did state that ‘there is no magic attaching to a misrepresentation made in writing rather than by word of mouth.’ In other words there should be no distinction between contracts made inter prasentes and inter absentes. Lord Millet, also one of the dissenting judges, had submitted that the distinction between mistake as to identity and mistake as to attributes should be abandoned.

It would appear that it would be more certain for an aggrieved party to make a claim under fraudulent misrepresentation than unilateral mistake as to identity. Fraudulent misrepresentation may be able to provide all the relief necessary. Fraudulent misrepresentation renders a contract voidable and not void (as in mistake) and the contract remains valid until it is set aside. Section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 goes on to say that that the right to rescind is lost when an innocent party purchases the goods. Therefor steps that the innocent party can take to render a voidable contract void is to inform the police before the goods pass to a third party and take other reasonable steps to inform potential buyers : Car and Universal Finance Co. v Caldwell. It is easier to prove fraud than mistake and provided that steps where taken to inform the relevant parties, may be less difficult to pursue.

Exclusion clauses

One consequence of the courts’ adoption of the defensive approach to exclusion clauses has been that exclusion clauses have not been interpreted in the same way as other terms of the contract; they have been interpreted more rigorously or restrictively. - Justin Santiago

Exclusion clauses are used by parties drawing up a contract to seek to exclude or restrict the amount of liability that may be incurred in the performance of that contract. Historically courts have generally taken a restrictive approach to the drafting and incorporation of exclusion clauses in a contract and their strict interpretation because it was felt exclusion clauses were performing a defensive function rather than obligation defining and to allocate risks between the parties. It is to provide to one party a defence for breach of contract by the other party (especially the party which has superior bargaining power).

The regulation of exclusions clauses involving a transactions in the course of business and a consumer is now determined by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. The act provides a e restrictive approach to exclusion clauses to provide protection to consumers and gives the courts considerable power to regulate exclusion clauses.

Courts have generally taken a strict view in restricting the over reliance of parties on exclusion clauses to exclude their liability as opposed to limiting their liability. Clauses which merely limit liability as opposed to excluding it altogether will be looked upon more favourably : Ailsa Craig Fishing Co. Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co. Ltd.

Several hurdles need to be overcome before it can be ascertained that the contracting party is bound by these clauses :-

1. Incorporation – whether the clauses have been properly incorporated and the rules of incorporation would require a higher standard than that required for terms. There must be notice of the clauses at or before the conclusion of the contract : Olley v Marlborough Court. It will not do if it is brought to the notice after the conclusion of the contract : Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking. The clause must be stated on a document that was intended to have contractual effect : Chapleton v Barry UDC. Thirdly and finally reasonable steps must be taken to bring the terms to the attention of the party : Parker v South Eastern Railway is particularly onerous : Spurling v Bradshaw (Lord Denning’s “red hand rule”) and Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd.

2. Construction – to determine whether the clauses have covered the events that have occurred. The courts have traditionally ensured that the exclusion clause is interpreted more strictly and rigorously against the party seeking to rely on them following the contra proferentum rule. The effect of this rule is that any ambiguous term would be resolved against the party relying on the clause : Houghton v Trafalgar Insurance Co. The courts would limit the scope of the exclusion clauses so that it covers only contractual liability unless the clauses expressly extends to negligence : Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v R. Since exclusion of liability for negligence has been expressly stated by Ida and theclause is wide enough to cover Ida, Ida could rely on it.

3. The final hurdle is the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA) which was designed to protect parties from exclusion clauses that sought to exempt liability of businesses that contracted in the course of business as required by S12 of UCTA. In determining whether the transaction was done in the course of business the courts decided that the object transacted for was integral to the business or it forms part of the regular course of dealing of that business : R & B Customs Brokers Ltd v UDT.

With the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 the courts are less willing to allow exclusions clauses that exclude the parties from consequences of their own negligence. For example Section 2(1) of UCTA invalidates any attempt by a contract term or notice to exclude or restrict liability for death or bodily injury resulting from negligence.

Section 2(2) of UCTA provides that a clause purporting to restrict liability will only be effective in so far as it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. The courts would look into the circumstances to gauge the reasonableness of the clauses : Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co.as well as the strength of bargaining power of the parties : Smith v Eric S Bush.

Additionally S. 11(2) which lays down a number of issues that the court will consider when deciding whether a term is reasonable which include the relative bargaining strengths of the parties, whether there was any inducement to agree to the terms or whether the party knew or reasonably ought to have known about them and Schedule 2 to the Act and involves looking at the clause whether it would be reasonable to allow reliance on it in the circumstances which have occurred.

George Mitchell v Finney Lock Seeds determines reasonableness in more practical terms. The clause would not be reasonable if ex gratia payments had been given to those who had suffered losses, the breach was serious and there was carelessness on the party relying on the clause and whether the the risk allocation rule was followed by taking insurance which would indicate the readiness to encounter such problems.

Thirdly there must be no other rule of law which would invalidate the exclusion clause. If there is a fundamental breach of the contract, the more serious the breach or the consequences of the breach, the less likely it is that the court will interpret the exclusion clause as applying to the breach. The exclusion clause is unlikely to be relied upon if there is a serious breach of contract where the breach relates to a particular obligation which is central to the contract : Karsales (Harrow) Ltd v Wallis or if the consequences of the breach are exceptionally serious : Harbutt Plasticine Ltd V Wayne Tank and Pump Co.

Lastly Section 3 of UCTA states that a term cannot exclude or limit liability for non performance or performance which was substantially different from what was agreed.

Sunday, February 1, 2009

Mistake

The law much choose between a narrow doctrine of mistake which favours certainty and a more liberal regime which favours flexibility - Justin Santiago

The doctrine of mistake allows an invalidation of an agreement based on an incorrect understanding by one or more parties to a contract resulting in the contract being void ab initio (from the beginning) and therefore no obligations can arise. Because of such drastic consequences, the courts have naturally confined mistake especially mistake as to the quality of the subject matter of a contract to very narrow limits in order for it to be operative.

The courts have also attempted to apply equitable principles in an attempt to nullify contracts based on a mistake if it resulted in unfairness to one of the parties. However this has led to uncertainty in the law and the courts appear to have gone back to a narrow interpretation of mistake in order to bring back certainty to the law.

In the House of Lords case Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd. it was established that common mistake can void a contract only if the mistake of the subject-matter was sufficiently fundamental to render its identity different from what was contracted, making the performance of the contract impossible. This is in line with the doctrine of the freedom of contract and the principle of caveat emptor that the courts are not prepared to grant relief based on bad bargain alone. The reasoning behind such a strict approach was that parties should not be allowed to escape from what merely was a bad bargain.

This reasoning has also led to similiar decision such as in Leaf v International Galleries a mistake as to the artist of a painting could not amount to quality making the thing essentially different. In Harrison and Jones v Burton and Lancaster a commercially inferior mixture of pure kapok and brush cotton and not solely pure kapok was not deemed to be essentially different. In Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams, a 1948 model of a car was not essentially different from a 1939 model. In Smith v Hughes the law even went to the point that even if one party knows that the other party is mistaken as to the quality the contract was still binding.

The Court of Appeal in Solle v Butcher purported to use equity to make a contract voidable if it would be "unconscientious for the other party to avail himself of the legal advantage which he had obtained.ties themselves and for innocent third parties. In Associated Japanese Bank v Credit du Nord, Steyn J stated that ‘Equity will give relief against common mistakes in cases where the common law will not, and it provides more flexible remedies, including the power the set aside the contract. In equity the contract may be voidable on the grounds of a fundamental mistake provided there was absence of blameworthy behaviour of either party at the time of contracting and if could be unconscionable for a party to insist on strict contractual rights because of the mistake.’

However Solle v Butcher left it unclear the precise parameters of the equiteable jurisdiction. The fundamental mistake of equity was not very much different from the mistake that was sufficiently fundamental to render its identity different under common law. It was also too obscure as to what amounted to unconscionable behaviour Also the significant difference in applying equity is that the effect of mistake in equity rendered a contract voidable and not void whereas in law the contract was rendered void. This created confusion with regard to third party rights.

The case of Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage is notable for purporting to overrule Solle v Butcher and denying the existence of an equitable jurisdiction to set aside contracts made under a fundamental common mistake. The courts in Great Peace returned certainty to the law relating to mistake as to quality which requires very stringent tests before a court will relieve such mistakes. This follows the purposive approach to contract law which the courts have taken and which seeks to enforce a contract rather than terminate it. This has lent certainty to the law. The less stringent tests required under equity which found favour with those who wanted a measure of flexibility have now been largely discarded. Rather than create confusion and to make certain the level of protection granted to third parties the courts have chosen not to use equity in cases involving mistake

The question whether the equitable jurisdiction to set contracts aside for unilateral mistakes has survived Great Peace has not been decided in the English courts, although its continued existence has been assumed: Huyton SA v Distribuidora Internacional de Productos Agricolas SA de CV and Harrison v Halliwell Landau.

It can be assumed that Great Peace has taken the law back to post Lever Bros but pre Solle v Butcher. In short mistake will no longer be flexible and parties should be on the alert when contracting.

Offer and Acceptance

What reasons have been given by the courts for the postal acceptance rule? Are they convincing? - Justin Santiago

Acceptance is not effective as a general rule unless communicated to the offeror. However the postal acceptance rule is one important exception.The postal rule was first used in Adams v Linsell to mean that acceptance takes place once a letter of acceptance is posted by the offeree. The defendant’s argument was that once they did not hear from the plaintiffs they were not in consensus and therefore proceeded to sell the wool. A number of cases proceeded along these lines Dunlop v Higgins as well as Household Carriage v Fire Insurance even though the offeror suffered hardship as a result of the letters of acceptance being delayed or getting lost in the post.

The postal acceptance rule flies against the requirement in the law of contract that acceptance has to be communicated. More importantly it weakens the doctrine of consensus at idem (meeting of minds) for a contract to take place as well as the mirror theory that there must be a definite offer mirrored by a definite acceptance. Hardship is placed on the offeror but not on the offeree. Also various complications can occur because of this exception to the general rule that acceptance is not effective as a general rule unless communicated to the offeror.

There have been several justifications according to Simon Gardner in his article "Trashing with Trollope" for this rule none of which have been satisfactory. The first one was that the post office was the agent of the offeror and so receipt of the letter by the agent is equivalent to receipt by the offeror. This is unacceptable as the post office is merely the conduit by which letters pass through. The post office cannot contract on behalf of the offeror. The second justification is that the offeror has chosen to start negotiations through the post and so the risk of delay or loss in the post should be on him. However this precludes situations where negotiations initiated by the offeror did not involve letters. The third justification is that it leads to business efficiency and and enables the offeree to act on a binding contract the moment the acceptance letter is posted. This justification is advantageous to the offeree but not to the offeror.

With such tenuous arguments it is was no wonder that the postal rule was circumscribed. Henthorn v Fraser decided that the postal rule would only apply if it was within the contemplation of the parties to use the post or in the case of Byrne v Van Tienhoven which began to confine the postal rule within narrow limits. This particular case made the law even more confusing as there were now separate rules for the postal rule with regard to offers and revocation of offers. The justification was that making acceptance complete at posting rather than delivery minimizes the window within which such a revocation may take place. Conversely making the offeror’s revocation ineffective until communicated prolongs the window during which an offeree may accept. The cumulative effect made it additionally onerous on the offeror.

The development of faster rules of communication at the time could have something to do with these particularly important developments. A situation could arise where the offeree who changes her mind: for example if after posting a letter of acceptance, she informs the offeror by telephone, before the letter arrives, that she rejects the offer. In the absence of English cases the Scottish case of Dunmore v Alexander is quoted where it was decided that because of the additional cost of using speedier communication was used, the effect would be that there would be an effective revocation and that the original acceptance will cease to be effective.

More confusion would follow with the decision in the case of Entores v Miles Far East Corp where it was held that the postal rule did not apply to telexes and that it was confined to non instantaneous forms of communication. The same approach was taken with regard to faxes in Brinkibon v Stahag Stahl.

The widest exception to the postal rule was recognised in Holwell Securities v Hughes where it was suggested that the postal rule ought not to apply where it would lead to manifest inconvenience and absurdity.

With more instant forms of communication such as e-mail, correspondence by post is becoming an exception rather than the rule. It is important that the postal rule be confined to the museum and that the rules of acceptance be applied regardless of the mode of communication. Differences in application of the rule for other more instant means of communication would make it difficult to apply uniformity to the rules of offer and acceptance.

It would seem that even with more modern technologies there is still proof of posting does not guarantee that there has been acceptance. Just because the message transmission ok on a fax machine or message sent in an email box does not necessarily mean that the receiver has received it.

It would seem that in any form of communication proof of posting is not proof of receipt and that parties must ensure that there acceptance is communicated regardless.

Misrepresentation

Recent case law suggest that litigants are generally better advised to pursue a claim in misrepresentation rather than for breach of contract - Justin Santiago

Misrepresentations are pre contractual false statements of existing facts which is one of the factors that have induced the other party to enter into the contract. Where a pre-contractual statement constitutes both a breach of contract and a misrepresentation, recent case law has suggested that the aggrieved party can look to misrepresentation as an alternative to breach of a term due to inherent advantages of rescission and/or claiming for damages under the tort of deceit and the tort of negligence as well as the Misrepresentation Act 1967. Against this however must be contrasted the problem of recovering any damages for purely innocent misrepresentations and the possible bars to the remedy of rescission.

In the case of remedies, prior to the enactment of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and the development of the tort of negligent misstatement in Hedley Byrne v Heller and Partners, many of the older cases were concerned with establishing a statement as a term, as damages were only available for misrepresentation in a very narrow range of circumstances i.e. fraudulent misrepresentation or negligent misrepresentation which required proof of various elements. Where a misrepresentation is fraudulent, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the statement was made knowing that it was untrue, without any genuine belief in its truth, or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or not : Derry v Peek). Once it is established that the statement was fraudulent, based on the tort of deceit all damages as a result of the fraud are recoverable with the general purpose being to place the victim in the position he occupied before the misrepresentation took place (‘reliance interest’).

Where a misrepresentation is negligent, a claim can be pursued under the tort of negligence under the principles established in Hedley Byrne v Heller and Partners and later confirmed in Esso Petroleum v Mardon. It must be proved by the claimant that there was a special relationship giving rise to a duty of care and the attendant acts in breach of this duty.

The Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides more remedies for litigants than previously under common law putting a claim in misrepresentation almost on par with a claim for breach of contract. Generally recission and damages are now more easily available under misrepresentations. This is because of increasing rights of consumers and the need to protect consumers from unscrupulous traders. However it must be remembered the courts are no longer as generous in the awarding of damages and remedies and have taken a more cautious approach. It is also difficult to prove that there was a misrepresentation in the first place. The claimant has to go on to the next step in deciding the type of misrepresentation because each will give rise to different remedies.

Under S 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 the claimant must establish that a misrepresentation has occurred and then secondly, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to establish that they had reasonable grounds to believe that the statement was true up to the point of contracting : Howard Marine and Dredging Co v Ogden and Sons, MCI Worldcom International v Primus Telecommunications.

Under S(2) where there are any intervening events (goods have been mixed, consumed, etc affecting the rights of 3rd parties) that would make recission impossible, there will be damages in lieu of recission : Floods of Queensferry Ltd v Shand construction Ltd and Government of Zanzibar v British Aerospace (Lancaster house) Ltd.

Measurement of damages under S2(1) allowed for all losses to be recoverable not simply those that were reasonably foreseeable : Royscott Trust Ltd v Rogerson which puts in on equal footing as if the tort of deceit has been committed. This follows from the test in Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd where damages are based on a direct consequence in which reasonable foreseeability has no application making it wider than that available under a breach of contract which are limited by the reasonable contemplation of the parties : : Hadley v Baxendale. However damages payable under S2(1) may be reduced on the ground of the representee’s contributory negligence : Gran Gelato Ltd v Richcliff Group Ltd.

Also many types of non-pecuniary loss which are not normally available for breach of contract can be recovered in the tort of deceit and also by using S. 2(1) of the 1967 Act (e.g. anxiety and stress). Furthermore in the case of East v Maurer it appears that a fraudulent misrepresentation can also give rise to lost opportunity cost putting it on the same footing as a breach of contract.

Rescission of the contract is also available regardless of whether the representation was made innocently, negligently or fraudulently. Additionally S1(a) of the Misrepresentation Act furthermore provides that there is a right to rescind even if the representation becomes part of the contract. Rescission in this context would mean that the contract is set aside and the parties put into the position that they would have been in had the contract never been made. Any goods or money which have been exchanged must be returned.

However the right to rescission can be lost if there is an affirmation of the contract even though the party was aware of the misrepresentation : Long v Lloyd, time lapse between misrepresentation and awareness is too long – Leaf v International Galleries, where third parties have acquired rights in the subject matter prior to avoidance of the contract : White v Garden and where the parties cannot be restored substantially to their original position : Clarke v Dickson.

In contrast a victim of a breach of a contract does not possess an automatic right to repudiate the contract. This would depend on whether the term which has been broken is a condition or an inonimate term where a breach of the term results in severe loss and damage: Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha. A breach of warranty will only give the injured party the right to claim damages, the contract cannot be repudiated : Bettini v Gye.

Consideration

Is the doctrine of consideration obsolete and unnecessary? - Justin Santiago

The doctrine of consideration is facing attack from various angles. Academics have argued that the doctrine is merely an invented concept. Several judgements have also shown clear exceptions to the doctrine and it would appear that the importance of the doctrine of consideration has decreased especially in contracts which have been modified halfway through their execution. The courts have taken a view that in such cases it would be better to supplant consideration with some other doctrine rather than abandon the contract altogether for want of consideration. The doctrine of consideration while it has been watered nevertheless remains a vital part of contract law in a majority of cases.

The traditional view of the law of contract requires that certain conditions be met before a contract could be legally enforceable. One of these was consideration. The requirement for consideration to give enforceability to a contract developed out of the rejection of formalities normally associated with gratuitous promises. Gratuitous promises unsupported by consideration are unenforceable.

The orthodox interpretation of consideration is based upon the idea of ‘reciprocity’, that a benefit received by the promisor in exchange for the benefit that he promises must co-exist with a detriment suffered by him which was expressed by Lush, J in Currie v Missa as some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.

The benefit-detriment theory & bargain theory supported the notion of consideration. The "benefit-detriment theory", in which a contract must be either to the benefit of the promisor or to the detriment of the promisee to constitute consideration.

The “bargain theory" states that the parties subjectively view the contract to be the product of an exchange or bargain. Proof of this exchange will lend enforceability to the contract.

There are three main purposes cited for the consideration requirement :-

The first is the cautionary requirement - parties are more likely to look before they leap when making a bargain than when making an off-the-cuff promise of a gift.

The second is the evidentiary requirement - parties are more likely to commemorate, or at least remember, a promise made due to a bargaining process.

The third is the channeling requirement - parties are more likely to coherently stipulate their specific desires when they are forced to bargain for them. Each of these rationales ensure that contracts are made by serious parties and are not made in error.

However the very notion of consideration has been undermined. Professor Atiyah argues that consideration is merely a label slapped on whenever the courts wanted to find a sufficient reason to enforce the promise. And this sufficient reason is usually the presence of a benefit or detriment. Treitel on the other hand argues that the courts have invented consideration by treating some act or forbearance as consideration irrespective or whether the parties have so regarded it. In Antons Trawling Co. Ltd v Smith, a New Zealand case, the doctrine of consideration was only seen as evidence that the parties intended to be bound by their agreement rather than as an end in itself. The more important requirement was the intention to create legal relations.

Notwithstanding these views, the doctrine of consideration was further developed along with several rules such as consideration must be sufficient but it need not be adequate, past consideration is not good consideration and consideration must move from the promisee.

Court decisions are beginning to show that these rules have their exceptions and there are ambiguities in these rules. For example what constitutes valuable consideration is subjective. In Chapple & Co v Nestle, sweet wrappers, although of trivial value, were good enough to be sufficient consideration. But does consideration have to have economic value? The cases of White v Bluett and the Amercan case of Hamer v Sidway demonstrate that consideration need not be looked at from the economic value angle alone. This may open the floodgates to how the value of consideration is measured.

In Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, it was decide that past consideration would still qualify as good consideration if the act constituting the consideration was done at the promisor’s request, the parties understood that the work was to be paid for in some way and that the promise would be legally enforceable had it been made prior to the acts constituting the consideration.

The doctrine of consideration has also been unevenly applied with regard to different cases especially in situations where the parties to a continuing contract wish to modify their obligations in the light of changed circumstances. In the case of Stilk v Myrick, the the notion of reciprocity was strictly applied in determining whether there was valid consideration. The sailors failed in their bid to enforce the promise of extra money for doing additional work due to the desertion of some of the crew as it was decided that the performance of an existing contractual obligation did not constitute valid consideration. There was no conferring of benefit on the shipowneres.

Similiarly in a long line of cases such as Pinnel’s Case and Foakes v Beer, the courts have never recognised part payments of debts as being valid consideration as the payment of a smaller sum that is owed does not constitute valid consideration as there is no added benefit to the creditor.

However in Williams v Roffey Brothers the need for reciprocity was put on hold. In this particular case the parties to a continuing contract wished to modify their obligations in the light of changed circumstances. The courts allowed the promisee to enforce the promise even though there were performing existing contractual obligations as the promisor had obtained a practical benefit and obviated a disbenefit by not having to switch contractors midway through the project. This would have the effect of rewarding parties who through some fault of their own had to renegotiate for the sake of avoiding a breakdown in the contract.

It would seem that in such cases the courts would be more inclined to look for additional benefits or further detriments on either party such as in Glasbrook Ltd v Glamorgan C.C. where a promise to do more than what one is legally obliged to do is good consideration or in Ward v Byham where it was decided that a mother by promising to keep a child ‘happy’ was more than a legal duty to merely keep the child was good consideration. The courts have however stopped short of recognizing the promise to perform a duty imposed by law as good consideration : Collins v Godefrey. The courts have also not applied the practical benefit debt situations where a promise to alter a contract for the acceptance of a lesser amount than promised : Re Selectmove.

The courts have also enforced promises despite the absence of consideration under the equitable remedy of promissory estoppel which stems from the doctrine of waiver which gives effect to a promise to forego rights. In Hughes v Metropolitan Railway and later confirmed in Central London Property Ltd v High Trees House it was stated that where by words or conduct a person makes an unambiguous representation as to his future conduct and intending that representation to be relied on and it has been relied on, the person will not be allowed to go back on his promise even though the promise was not supported by consideration. This is an equitable concept that has clearly defined limits and would apply to limited cases.

It would seem that the doctrine of consideration has been watered down in instances where parties renegotiate their obligations halfway through the contract. However we cannot turn away from the fact that in the majority of cases, consideration is determining factor in enforcing a contract. Abandoning consideration also abandons the essential idea of requiring performance as practical benefit in the words of Chen-Wishart in their article "Consideration, Practical Benefit and the Emperor’s New Clothes" is like the Emperor’s new clothes – illusory and open to ridicule. Ultimately consideration performs an important evidential function and is a valuable signal that the parties intend to be bound by their agreement rather than an end in itself : Antons Trawling Co Ltd v Smith.

In civil law jurisdictions, consideration is not a requirement for a contract at all. In France, an ordinary contract is said to form simply on the basis of a "meeting of the minds" or a "concurrence of wills".

Germany has a special approach to contracts, which ties into property law. Their 'abstraction principle' (Abstraktionsprinzip) means that the personal obligation of contract forms separately from the title of property being conferred. When contracts are invalidated for some reason ( e.g. a car buyer is so drunk that he lacks legal capacity to contract) the contractual obligation to pay can be invalidated separately from the proprietary title of the car. Unjust enrichment law, rather than contract law, is then used to restore title to the rightful owner.

Scottish contract law differs to the extent that there is no need for a party to receive consideration for their performance. This means that it is perfectly legitimate for a contract to compel an individual to perform and to receive nothing in return. Such agreements are known as gratuitous contracts. This rule also explains the existence of the law of promises as a branch of the law of obligations.

Implied Terms

Courts are reluctant to give effect to terms that are not expressly stated in contracts - Justin Santiago

Contracts have to be precise in order for it to be enforced by either party. Only if there is a dispute will the courts play a role in interpreting the contract. There is not much contention with regard to express terms in writing as long as they are precise and can stand by itself : Scammell & Nephew Ltd v Ouston. Parties are bound by the terms which have been signed : L’Estrange v Graucob (there must be a belief that the other party did assent to the onerous terms – Ontario Court of Appeal case Tilden Ren-a-Car Co. v Clendenning and there is no plea of non est factum – Saunders v Anglia Building Society but not carelessness : United dominions Trust Ltd v Western) and generally parties will be prevented from adducing extrinsic evidence to add, vary or contradict what is written in the contract via the parole evidence rule : Jacobs v Batavia & General Plantations Trust Ltd.

However not all contracts are so straightforward and there may be times when terms will have to be implied into the contract. In such cases courts will take the purposive approach and will strive to uphold the contract as far as possible. The purposive approach validates the argument that agreements should always be enforced. The courts will do their best to give effect to the contract and will step in to give effect to terms not expressly stated in the contract which are as follows :-

Intention of the parties

There may be times when a particular statement made or assurance given in the course of negotiations leading up to the contract forms part of the contract. In such cases the courts will look into the intention of the parties which will be assessed objectively. Lord Moulton in Heilbut, Symons and Co v Buckleton set out the various criteria to ascertain this intention.

Verification : a statement is likely to be a term of the contract if the maker of the statement dissuades the other party from verifying the statement : Schawel v Reade on the other hand it is unlikely to be a term if the maker of the statement asks the other party to verify its truth : Ecay v Godfrey.

Importance : a statement is likely to be a term of the contract where it is of such importance to the person to whom it is made that had it not been made he would not have entered into the contract : Couchman v Hill.

Special Knowledge : a statement is likely to be a term if the maker of the statement has some special knowledge or skill compared to the other party : Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams.

Timing : a statement is likely to be a term if the lapse of time between the making of the statement and the contract’s conclusion is short : Routledge v McKay

Incorporation of terms into a contract

The incorporation of terms into a contract can be agreed upon by the contracting parties based on the following rules depending on whether they are written or oral terms.

Written terms may be incorporated into the contract but 3 hurdles must be overcome :-

1. Notice of the terms must be given at or before the time of concluding the contract :Olley v Marlborough Court
2. The term must be contained in a document which was intended to have contractual effect : Chapleton v Barry UDC
3. Reasonable steps must be taken to bring the terms to the attention of the other party : Parker v South Eastern Railway (must make special effort if it is known that the other party is disabled : Richardson, Spence and Co Ltd v Rowntree

Oral terms may be incorporated by way of course of dealing which is regular and consistent : McCutcheon v David MacBrayne. (however contrast with Hollier v Rambler Motors where three or four contracts over a period of five years was held not to be consistent). Courts are also more inclined to infer incorporation of terms if the parties are of equal bargaining power and if both were in the trade and such terms were habitually incorporated into these contracts : British Crane Hire Corporations Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd.

Implication by way of statute, custom or common law

A court may imply terms based on statute such as the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which implies certain terms into contracts for the sale of goods namely that the goods are of satisfactory quality and that the goods supplied are reasonably fit for that purpose. The function of these implied terms is to provide some protection for the expectations of purchasers, particularly consumers and because it is governed by statute is one of the rare exceptions where the courts will give effect to an implied term.

A court may also imply terms based on by custom – a contract may be deemed to incorporate any relevant customer of the market, trade or locality in which the contract is made : Hutton v Warren.

A court may imply terms at common law to give the transaction such business efficacy as the parties must have intended : The Moorcock. However high standards must be satisfied. Both parties must know that the term is implied : Spring v NASDS and it must be clear that both parties would in fact have agreed to the term : Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper. Secondly terms implied in law as a general incidence involving particular relationships such as employer and employee Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage, Mahmud v BCCI and landlord – tenant : Liverpool CC v Irwin.

Once the terms of the contract have been ascertained, they must be interpreted to establish their true meaning. The starting point is that it is for the courts, not the parties, to decide what is the proper interpretation of the contract. There has been a marked shift in the approach of the courts away from a literal approach towards a more purposive approach to interpretation with particular emphasis being laid upon the adoption of an interpretation which has regard to the commercial purpose of the transaction – Lord Steyn’s dissenting speech in Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope. He again reiterated the approach in Mannai Investments Col Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance when he said that the terms would be interpreted in a way in which a reasonable commercial person would construe them.

Lord Hoffman in Investors Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich Building Society recapitulated the concept of the modern approach emphasising the role of language according to common sense principles bereft of the old intellectual baggage of legal interpretation.

Terms

Too great a willingness to classify a term as a condition encourages termination of contracts rather than their performance - Justin Santiago

Because a contract consists of terms of varying importance it is necessary to separate the importance terms from the less importance ones. However in most contracts it will not be expressly stated whether a term is a condition or warranty which are how terms are typically classified. Because of the severe consequences attached to a breach of a condition namely resulting in the termination of the contract and the awarding of damages for any loss suffered (or alternatively in the affirmation of the contract and a recovery of damages for the breach) as opposed to a breach of a warranty which only entitled me to claim damages the courts are more cautious than willing to classify terms as conditions.

Courts would look into three ways of classifying terms into conditions or warranties – classification by the parties, statutory classification or judicial classification.

Classification by the parties puts the courts in their role squarely as an interpreter of contracts rather than a maker of them and will only consider it a condition if it has been alluded to as such by the parties. Under the doctrine of the freedom of contract, courts will also not question the parties’ own classification of the contractual term as amounting to a condition : Lombard North Central plc v Butterworth. However the courts must be satisfied that the parties intended to use the term ‘condition’ in its technical sense will be reluctant to give the meaning to the word condition merely by the parties expressly stating it as such : Schuler AG v Wickman Tool Sales Ltd.

The courts will look into what the parties had in mind when they drew up a contract and whether the parties intended it to be a condition : Couchman v Hill as well as other factors such as standard terms on contracts of a certain type as well as the views and practices of the commercial community : State Trading Corporation of India Ltd v M Goldetz Ltd.

Nevertheless the courts have had a difficult time in determining what exactly is meant by going to the root of the contract and this has lead to uncertainty exemplified in The Naxos where different levels of courts had different opinions as to whether the obligation of the seller to have the cargo ready for delivery at any time amounted to a condition or not.

The classification into a condition based on its importance could also result in injustice to an innocent party as in the case of Arcos v Ronnasen where the consequences of a breach of the condition was negligible. There would also be situations where the reason for withdrawal are wholly unrelated to the breach but rather for corollary economic reasons : The Mihalis Angelos.

This led the courts to consider a more flexible approach and to look at other approaches to redress the balance.

The first was to limit the number of terms which are classified as conditions.

The second approach was to place a statutory restriction upon the right of a buyer to reject goods for example S15A of SOGA 1979 restricts the right of a buyer to reject goods where the breach is so slight and it would be unreasonable for him to reject them. Thus the buyer would only have a claim in damages.

The third approach was to focus more attention on the consequences of breach thereby giving courts greater remedial flexibility. This led to the inonimate term definition which is distinguished based on the fact that a breach of this type of term would not give rise automatically to termination, the consequences would have to be serious enough to deprive the innocent party of substantially the whole benefit of what has been bargained for : Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.

This judicial classification was applied in the case of The Hansa Nord where even though a condition was breached the party that wanted to terminate the contract could not because the consequences were not serious. A party could also not use a minor breach by the other party to terminate a contract which has proven to be a bad bargain : Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen Tangen.

The courts would also look into whether withdrawal as an exceptional form of relief be made available only where damages would not be an adequate remedy. More importance placed on the quantification of damages would negate the necessity of withdrawal as an easier route as decided in Bunge v Tradax.

Yet another approach was put forth by Roger Brownsword in his article "Retrieving Reasons, Retrieving Rationality" in which he opined the termination of a contract should boil to whether the innocent party had a good reason for doing so. Under this reason centered regime the courts should consider the parties’ reasons for withdrawing. Thus if an innocent party seeks in good faith to withdraw for breach then the right to withdraw should hold without restriction.

Intention to contract

"The intent of man cannot be tried for the devil himself knows not the intent of man" - Justin Santiago

Generally it is held that contracts are valid based on the objective intention or reasonable man test in order that there be a reasonable degree of certainty as to whether parties have shown or expressed intention to contract through their contract or words. This requirement as expressed in Scammell and Newphew Ltd v Ouston which emphasizes the individualistic philosophy of English law of contract which militates against any subjective intention being used as an easy escape from an imprudent bargain. However the courts would try to put into effect what they believe to be the intention of the parties (or conversely to prevent an injustice) by looking into the subjective intention in certain exceptional situations. This occurs when there is a mistake as to the terms of the offer as well as to disagreements as to when an agreement was reached.

The wills theory of contract seeks to enforce the will of the parties and is closely associated with the laissez-faire philosophy and attributes contractual obligations to the will of the parties entering into agreements of their own choice on terms that have been agreed upon. Closely linked with this obligation is that there must be an agreement between parties. This is known as consensus at idem or meeting of minds. If there is a meeting of minds there is agreement. Only if an agreement is reached can the courts consider what action to take if either one of the parties refuse to perform according to their agreement. To know whether an agreement is reached or not is determined by the objective test.

An application of this objective test to decide whether promises exchanged and expressed by parties amounted to an agreement was found in the case of Centrovincial Estates plc v Merchant Investors Assurance where it was held that an offeree may accept an offer in the sense which a reasonable man would give it, despite clear evidence that the offer did not represent the offeror's true intention, and had not in any way been acted upon by the offeree.

The justification for an objective test in Centrovincial Estates was to give certainty to the law and prevent any one party to suddenly turn around and saying that the terms that were agreed upon were not intended or was a mistake. The real intention of the parties or the subjective intentions of the parties would be irrelevant when deciding if there is a contract.

However the decision in this case has been criticized by Prof Atiyah for not taking into account detrimental reliance as an indication of whether an agreement had been reached. His argument was based on the fact that mutual promises between parties alone would not suffice to conclude a contract. There was a need for the party accepting the promise by the other party to have detrimentally relied on the promise by the other party to have detrimentally relied on the promise before the court would conclude there was a legally binding agreement. In Centrovincial Estates there was no detrimental reliance hence there was no agreement His views were based on the case of The Hannah Blumenthal which he says lends support to his argument that Centrovincial Estates was wrongly decided. In The Hannah Blumenthal case an agreement to abandon a contract to arbitrate was allowed where one party created a situation in which he was estopped from asserting that he had abandoned the contact because he had caused the other party to alter their position in reliance upon the belief that the contract had been abandoned. However it was argued that the reliance was merely to provide evidence of that fact that the sellers had accepted the buyers offer (acceptance by conduct – Brogden v Metropolitan Railway) and not any prerequisite to the formation of any contract which leaves the law in Centrovincial Estates intact.

While this decision lent some certainty to the law at the same time it also imposed some rigidity there was the problem of being insufficient to cover all situations. This is when the objective test which involves detached objectivity is modified so that it becomes promisor objectivity and promisee objectivity which places greater emphasis on the subjective intention of the parties (quoting Howarth, The Meaning of Objectivity in Contract, Law Quarterly Review).

Promisor objectivity is used in situations where the offeree knows that the offeror is suffering from a mistake as to the terms of the offer. This is illustrated in the case of Hartog v Colins and Shields where the defendant sold hare skins at an unbelievably low price. The courts using the promisor objectivity test ruled that a reasonable man in the promisor’s shoes knew or ought to have known the real price and would not have offered to sell at such a low price. As such the claimants were not allowed to snatch a bargain at the promisor’s expense.

Promisee objectivity was relevant in Scriven Bros v Hindley where the offeror offered a price from an auction catalogue which was overvalued and the offeree failed to take note of the error. The courts using the promisee objectivity test ruled that a reasonable man in the offeree’s shoes would have known that the price being offered was far too high. As such there was no agreement and the contract for sale was null and void as to go through with it would mean that the auctioneers would profiteer from his own mistake.

When it comes to mistake as to quality the courts are less reluctant to look into the innermost mind of the parties. The mere fact that one party to the contract is mistaken in his innermost mind as to the quality of the subject matter is not sufficient of itself, automatically to render a contract void. In Smith v Hughes it was decided that a person’s conduct with regard to the quality of the subject matter proposed by the other party is determined by the reasonable man regardless of the person’s actual intentions. What determines quality of subject matter is however subject to debate and there is some difficulty in assessing what exactly amounts to quality which makes it the thing essentially different from what it was believed to be : Bell v. Lever Brothers.

The next issue to be tackled would be to know when is an agreement reached. The courts have preferred to use the ‘mirror-image’ rule of contract formation which is to find in the documents that passed between the parties a clear and unconditional offer which is matched or mirrored by an equally clear an unequivocal acceptance. This was the decision of the majority in Butler Machine tools Co. Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corporation. The difficulty of battle of the forms offer-counter offer situations would be resolved by the “last shot” principle where a contract is formed as soon as the last of the forms is sent without objection. This can be viewed as the objective approach.

Lord Denning’s dissenting opinion centered on the mirror image rule being out of date and that the intention of the parties was more important. He held that all the multiple documents passing between the parties should be read as a single document and gleaned from it together with the conduct of the parties whether they have reached an agreement on all material points and this opinion was reiterated in Gibson v Manchester City Council but was rejected by the majority. It would appear that the mirror-image rule would still apply in determining when an agreement is reached and this appears to not take the subjective intention of the parties into account.

A further situation which lends credence to the argument that the subjective intentions of the parties is relevant is put forward by Spencer in his article "Signature, Consent and the Rule in L’Estrange v Graucob" where he states that that two parties’ subjective agreement is at variance with the result achieved by applying the objective test. So in practical terms if one party wanted to sell a bull but actually wanted to sell a cow and the other party wanted to buy a bull but actually wanted to buy a cow both parties would end up with a situation that neither party wanted. This is a situation of cross purpose mistake and on the basis of latent ambiquity in the terms of an offer and acceptance operate to negative consent : Raffles v Wichelhaus emphasizing the importance of the subjective intention of the parties in contract formation.

Thus it is important that within the general objective framework of contractual intentions, the inter subjective perception of the parties may still be significant although in the majority of cases Centrovincial Estates is still good law and that the objective test would still apply to agreements which were absent of any mistake by any of the parties and where the agreements were expressly stated.

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